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1. Introduction 
 
There are many things that organisations of any size can do to prepare for a disaster or 
crisis.  Traditionally, the advice given to business has focused on identifying risks, reducing 
their likely occurrence, and planning in advance how to respond.  More recently, there is 
growing interest in the broader concept of organisational resilience which includes planning 
for crisis but also considers traits that lead to organisational adaptability and ability to thrive 
despite adverse circumstances.   
 
In this paper we examine the policy frameworks1 within New Zealand that influence the 
resilience of small and medium sized businesses (SMEs).    The first part of the paper 
focuses on the New Zealand context, including the prevailing political and economic 
ideologies, the general nature of New Zealand SMEs and the nature of New Zealand’s 
hazard environment.  The paper then goes on to outline the key policy frameworks in place 
relevant to SMEs and hazards.  The final part of the paper examines the way the pre-
existing policy environment influenced the response of SMEs and Government following the 
Canterbury earthquakes.   
 
Whilst this report’s focus is on the SME sector, it is clear from both the disaster research 
tradition and responses from public sector and businesses interviewed in this research that 
consideration must be given to their interdependencies. SMEs are reliant on many things, 
particularly critical infrastructure such as power, water, telecommunications and transport 
links.  Additional interdependencies relate to suppliers, staff and customers.  The 
preparedness of SMEs cannot be viewed in isolation as any significant failure in other 
sectors is likely to have an impact on their performance. 
 
  
                                                
1 Policy initiatives can include one or more of three approaches; persuasion via methods such as 
communication campaigns, coercion by providing rewards or incentives (or by enabling private 
institutions to do so) or commands via rules or regulations (Victoria University School of Government, 
2010). 
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2. Context 
 
The environment in which SMEs operate is affected by both micro level enterprise policy and 
macro level – the rules of the game (Greene & Storey, 2009).  This section will outline the 
key macro level policies that influence both the overall hazards policy arena and the specific 
responses to the Canterbury earthquakes.  
 
2.1. Government and Economy 
 
New Zealand has a small economy largely free of any trade restrictions.  Primary industries 
are extremely important with commodities accounting for just 8% of GDP but over 50% of 
export earnings.  Manufacturing accounts for 12% of GDP and services 71% (The Treasury, 
2012b). 
 
Key Statistics (March/June 2012)  
Population  4,430,400 
Unemployment rate 6.8% 
GDP per capita  45,769 
Average weekly earnings $1,013.09 
Figure 1 - New Zealand Key Statistics  
Source: (Statistics New Zealand, 2012c) 
 
Since 1984, New Zealand has transformed itself from a highly protectionist economy with 
extensive regulation, tariffs and protection into one of the least regulated economies within  
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD (The Treasury, 2012b).  
Changes in the 1980’s resulted in enormous public sector reform.  The Government of the 
day commenced a comprehensive review of the role of the state resulting in privatization or 
corporatization of many state assets and deregulation of all sectors.   The focus then, and 
now, became ensuring that “the state was to deliver policy and goods and services only 
where market failure demonstrably existed” (United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012). New Zealand also has a strong social welfare 
tradition with $25.3 billion spent in the last financial year in social security and welfare 
payments.  This is 31% of core Government expenditure (The Treasury, 2012a).  Also of 
relevance to New Zealand’s policy framework is the stable nature of governance and 
institutions, high levels of satisfaction with public service and its’ ranking as the least corrupt 
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public sector in the 182 countries considered by Transparency International  (State Services 
Commission, 2011; Transparency International, 2012).  New Zealand ranks 1st out of 183 
countries for ease of starting a business and 3rd for the ease of doing business (World Bank, 
2011). 
The overall approach to regulation is summed up in the Government Statement on 
Regulation issued on 17 August 2009; key excerpts of this are shown as Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 - Government Statement on Regulation 
Source: (The Treasury, 2011) 
 
In practical terms this philosophy often means that the first question to be asked in relation to 
any business issue is whether it is the role of the Government to get involved. 
 
In addition to this push for better regulation, the current Government has also implemented a 
program of ‘Better Public Services (BPS)’ aimed at ensuring that the New Zealand public 
sector,- which accounts for almost a quarter of the economy, is innovative, efficient and 
delivery focused rather than departmentally oriented (Birchfield, 2012; State Services 
Commission, 2012). 
 
2.2. Decision Making Structures 
 
Responsibility for reduction, readiness, response and recovery are shared by both national 
and local Government.  The structure of these bodies is outlined in Figure 3. 
Better Regulation, Less Regulation 
…. improving the quality of regulation is a priority for this government. We believe that better 
regulation, and less regulation, is essential to assist New Zealand to become more internationally 
competitive and a more attractive place to live and do business. 
 
Our Commitments 
We will introduce new regulation only when we are satisfied that it is required, reasonable, and 
robust.  
We will review existing regulation in order to identify and remove requirements that are 
unnecessary, ineffective or excessively costly. 
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Figure 3 - National and Local Government overview 
Sources: (Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2012; Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management, 2002; United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2012) 
 
The high level body responsible for emergency management is the Cabinet Committee for 
Domestic and External Security Coordination (DES).  This committee is chaired by the Prime 
Minister and includes the ministers responsible for departments that play essential roles in 
readiness and response.  This committee receives strategic policy advice from the Officials 
Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination.  Members of this committee 
are the chief executives of relevant ministries (Officials’ Committee for Domestic and 
External Security Coordination, 2007). 
 
2.3. Hazards 
 
New Zealand SMEs are exposed to a wide range of natural hazards, both geological and 
weather related (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007).  
In addition to the geological and weather related hazards outlined in the hazard map in 
Appendix one, animal and plant pests and diseases also pose significant risk to the 
agriculture sector as New Zealand’s geographic isolation has meant that its indigenous flora 
and fauna have been protected.  The impact of a significant pest or disease entering the 
country can be catastrophic for the affected sector, particularly if it results in the closure of 
export markets (Officials’ Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination, 
2007). 
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2.4. Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
On 4 September 2010, a MM 7.1 earthquake occurred 40k west of the Christchurch Central 
Business District (CBD) at 4.35 a.m.  This event caused significant damage to property; 
however there was no loss of life.  At that time, rebuild and repair costs from the earthquake 
were estimated at $5 billion (MYOB, 2011).    Unfortunately, this event was the forerunner of 
the more devastating MM 6.3 shake, 13km south east of the CBD at 12:51 p.m. on 22 
February 2011 which caused 185 deaths and extensive damage to the central business 
district as well as many residential areas.  The combined effect of these two major 
earthquakes, along with a further 2 aftershocks above magnitude 6, has resulted in over 
1000 commercial buildings being demolished and 7057 residential dwellings being placed in 
a red zone where buildings are to be demolished as land remediation has been deemed 
uneconomic (Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012a).  Residential losses are 
estimated at over NZD 12 billion, commercial at NZ 10-12 billion and infrastructure repairs to 
roads, bridges, fresh, waste and storm water systems  at NZD 2 - 5billion (Brownlee, 2012; 
Muir-Woods, 2012; Stronger Christchurch Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT), 2012). 
 
2.5. SMEs in New Zealand 
 
The small size of New Zealand means that definitions of SME may be quite different from 
those of larger economies.  Government bodies and official statistics most commonly define 
SMEs as those having fewer than 20 full time equivalent employees (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2011). Generalised characteristics of these firms are that they have limited 
access to resources, personalised management styles and little formal structure (Battisti, 
Lee, & Cameron, 2009).  As of February 2011, there are 456,929 enterprises falling into this 
categorisation comprising 97.2% of all significant economic enterprises in New Zealand 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2012a).  SMEs employ 30% of New Zealand’s working population 
and contribute an estimated 40% of the economy’s total value added output (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2011; Statistics New Zealand, 2012a). New Zealand has the 
highest number of businesses per head of population in the OECD (Ministry of Economic 
Development, 2011). 
 
SMEs tend to have operated for a much shorter period of time than larger enterprises, with 
the majority being less than six years old (Ministry of Economic Development, 2011).  More 
than 50% of these enterprises are family or owner-operated businesses (Ministry for 
Economic Development, 2012).  SMEs are the majority organisational size in all sectors of 
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the economy (Figure 4).  There is enormous variation in knowledge, skills and capabilities 
within the SME sector. 
 
Sector 
SME % of total 
enterprises in 
sector 
SME % of total 
employment in 
sector 
Rental, hiring, & real estate services 99.8 59.8 
Financial & insurance services 99.4 14.9 
Agriculture, forestry, & fishing 98.9 62.9 
Construction 98.4 52.2 
Other services 98.3 66.2 
Professional, scientific, & technical services 98.1 42.3 
Information media & telecommunications 97.1 12.7 
Arts & recreation services 96.9 34.1 
Administrative & support services 96.1 19.7 
Transport, postal, & warehousing 96.1 20.9 
Retail trade 95.6 30.2 
Wholesale trade 94.8 35.8 
Health care & social assistance 93.3 16.4 
Accommodation & food services 93.2 47.8 
Mining 93.2 18.4 
Electricity, gas, water, & waste services 92.5 10.7 
Manufacturing 91.3 23.3 
Public administration & safety 81.6 1.9 
Education & training 76.5 15.9 
Figure 4 - SMEs by sector 
Source: (Statistics New Zealand, 2012a) 
 
 
 
3. Policy 
 
New Zealand has very few policies specifically aimed at SMEs in any context.  This section 
will firstly discuss the overall policy framework for hazards and resilience before then 
outlining the structure and actions of the Government ministry directly responsible for 
considering SME policy.   Figure 5 outlines the framework for prevention, response and 
recovery from disaster - illustrating that disaster preparedness is considered to be the 
responsibility of all of Government.  Within this framework there are three key statutes (and 
accompanying rules and plans) which are described here.   
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Figure 5 - New Zealand Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) Framework 
Source: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008) 
 
 
 
3.1. Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002 
 
 This act sets out the roles of the civil defence emergency management organisations along 
with central and local Government departments, lifeline utility providers and emergency 
services with regard to reduction, readiness, response and recovery (4Rs) as detailed in 
Figure 6.  
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Figure 6 - Integrated Approach to Emergency Management 
Source: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008) 
 
The Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) is a small agency 
which operates as a business unit within the Department of Internal Affairs.  Its 
responsibilities are  to provide policy advice, ensure that structures are established that are 
capable of managing and responding to disasters, support and ensure coordination of local 
Government in their actual delivery of the four Rs and to manage central Government 
response and recovery for events that are beyond the capabilities of local Government 
(Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2012).   
 
MCDEM have a strong focus on public education.  The primary focus of awareness 
campaigns is the reduction of harm through strategies such as restraining heavy objects and 
preparedness for self-sufficiency for a worst case of 3 days following an event.    The 
National CDEM strategy (see Figure 7) makes specific reference to business having a key 
role in overall resilience as well as stating a goal of improving business preparedness.   
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Recent campaigns such as ‘Shake Out’; a national earthquake preparedness exercise have 
aimed at increasing both business and individual preparedness. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Components of a Resilient New Zealand 
Source: (Department of Internal Affairs, 2008) 
 
Following the philosophy of local solutions for local problems, implementation of local risk 
and emergency management is the responsibility of 16 regional CDEM groups who are 
effectively geographically clustered local and regional councils (see Figure 8 for an 
example).  They are responsible for the implementation of the CDEM Act and related plans 
as well as the administration and compliance with other relevant legislation, specifically in 
the resilience context, the Resource Management Act and the Building Act.   This 
devolvement of responsibilities to local authorities allows for considerable community 
involvement in the consideration of decisions on the level of investment they are willing to 
make in reduction and readiness.   
 
The regional CDEM controller or the local mayor may declare a state of an emergency for all 
or part of its specific area and is then responsible for any required response.  For an event 
13 
 
as significant as the Canterbury earthquakes, a national state of emergency may be 
declared by the Minister of Civil Defence resulting in central government control of the 
emergency phase (Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management, 2002).   
 
 
Figure 8 - Canterbury CDEM Group 
Source: (Canterbury Civil Defence Emergency Management Group, 2012) 
 
One of the first lines of contact for businesses seeking advice in relation to hazard 
preparedness is potentially the local government CDEM team; however a capability 
assessment of the CDEM local government sector by MCDEM identified a lack of capability 
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in the area of business continuity management.  The traditional focus of emergency 
managers has been on building response capability.  There are some initiatives underway to 
seek to provide resources for business – see for example a new website produced by 
Auckland CDEM staff2 and a guide produced specifically for SMEs by the Resilient 
Organisations research programme in New Zealand3.  
 
 
The Earthquake Commission (EQC) who provide a nationwide system of residential only 
earthquake insurance cover also have a significant role in facilitating both research and 
education regarding reduction and prevention of damage from natural disasters (Earthquake 
Commission, 2012). 
 
3.2. Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA) 
 
The Resource Management Act (RMA) 1991 replaced more than 50 existing laws relating to 
environmental protection and town planning (Ministry for the Environment, 2012b).  The 
RMA mandates that any activity effecting the environment requires a consent which is 
granted by the regional or local council depending upon the type of activity.  The Act requires 
regional authorities to develop specific rules and standards for their area, within the general 
guidelines set down within the Act and related policy statements – see Figure 9. 
 
                                                
2 www.resilientbusiness.co.nz 
3 
http://www.resorgs.org.nz/images/stories/pdfs/OrganisationalResilience/sme_resilience_brochure.pdf 
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Figure 9 - Resource Management Act 1991 Overview 
Source: (Ministry for the Environment, 2012a) 
 
However, despite its extensive length and complexity, the consents process driven by the 
RMA currently gives insufficient weight to the consideration of natural hazard risks. An 
advisory group commissioned by the Government to review the Act has recommended that 
the “management of natural hazards and urban infrastructure” should be added into the list 
of considerations for councils granting consents (Small, 2012b).  This recommendation 
stems from the realisation that consents for residential subdivisions were granted in 
Christchurch with little apparent consideration of the potential (and now proven) liquefaction 
risks (Small, 2012a).    If this change proceeds, it may result in improved risk reduction with 
an expectation that consents would be declined for buildings or activities in areas of 
increased hazard.  Whilst the Act does currently allow local Government to do this, the 
proposed changes would give natural hazard issues an increased emphasis (Saunders & 
Beban, 2012). 
 
3.3. Building Act 2004 
   
 This Act is concerned with ensuring the safety and integrity of built structures with specific 
criteria set out in the Building Code including considerations relating to the land (Officials’ 
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Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination, 2007).    The code is 
performance-based, setting out standards buildings must perform to, rather than specifying 
how they must be constructed.  Plans must be submitted to local councils and consents 
issued before construction commences with inspections taking place both during and at the 
completion of construction. Recognising the tremendous advances in knowledge with regard 
to the earthquake resistance of structures, the Act has a specific section dealing with the 
risks posed by older buildings.  Structures are classed as ‘Earthquake Prone’ with this 
determination made by comparing the assessed performance of the building in question with 
that expected of a new building (Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, 2012).  
The Earthquake Prone Buildings section of the Act requires local authorities to develop a 
policy in consultation with their communities regarding these buildings which is to take into 
account the social and economic impacts of any recommended remedial actions.  In 
practice, this meant that commercial building owners were allowed considerable time to 
consider strengthening their buildings – a significant factor in the resulting casualties and 
damage in the Christchurch central business district.  This section of the Act is currently 
under review.  Whilst this review is still underway, one of the reported impacts of the 
Canterbury earthquakes is that owners of earthquake prone buildings in Wellington are 
unable to attract tenants and face enormous insurance premiums as global reinsurers 
reassess New Zealand risks.  
 
In anticipation of potentially heightened requirements or shortened timeframes for requiring 
the strengthening of existing buildings, property owners are already lobbying for Government 
financial support claiming that it is simply uneconomic and that strengthening is a public 
good (Harris, 2012). 
 
3.4. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) 
 
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), formed in 2012, incorporates 
the former Ministry of Economic Development, the prime agency responsible for SME and 
general business issues, together with the Ministry of Science and Innovation, Department of 
Labour and Department of Building and Housing. Its creation is in line with the Better Public 
Services program and aims to ensure that there is coherence in innovation and business 
support initiatives, a weakness noted in a report issued by the OECD  (OECD, 2007).    The 
Ministry has a specific small business unit which is responsible for the Small Business 
Advisory Group (SBAG).  This group, established in 2003, meets every two months to 
consider potential areas of concern to SMEs as well as to review issues highlighted by the 
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Minister for Small Business or other Government Departments.   The ten members of the 
group are all SME owners and represent a variety of sectors and geographic locations within 
New Zealand and provide a sounding board and voice for the SME sector with reports made 
directly to the Minister for Small Business (Ministry of Economic Development, 2012; Small 
Business Advisory Group, 2012).   
 
MBIE is also responsible for the creation of the extensive business.govt.nz website which 
aims to provide a single internet destination to give advice to businesses on dealing with 
Government agencies, compliance, and general business guidance.  This website is aimed 
specifically at enabling quick and easy information access by SMEs.   Following a call by 
SBAG in April 2012 for business survival/disaster planning and recovery information to be 
pulled together into a single location within the business.govt.nz portal, this site now contains 
many useful resources on the topics of crisis management and preparedness, a detailed 
interactive 10 step business survival planning tool along with a case study and tips from a 
Canterbury business.   These resources are located under Laws and Regulation/Health and 
Safety.  Their location in this area is understandable given that some of the content deals 
with regulatory requirements such as evacuation plans, however, it may also give a slightly 
confused message as to how resilience planning should be considered by business. 
 
Additional help for SMEs is provided through the regional business partners network which 
are business advisors usually from the regional economic development agency or chamber 
of commerce, funded by New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (the Government economic 
development agency) and the Ministry of Science and Innovation (now part of MBIE) 
(Ministry for Economic Development, 2012). 
 
3.5. Policy – summary 
 
Whilst there are no specific policies aimed at SMEs, this section has outlined a significant 
framework aimed at ensuring the resilience of key sectors upon which SMEs depend – 
Lifelines and Government departments via the CDEM Act, and built structures via the RMA 
and Building Acts.  In addition to this, the SBAG group and the MBIE ensure that there is a 
forum for SMEs to both be heard and to give important feedback to all of Government in 
relation to policies that impact on SMEs.  
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4. Policy Responses to the Canterbury Earthquakes 
 
Most of the policy responses to the Canterbury earthquakes were created in response to 
the events, rather than as pre-determined plans.  However their creation was guided by 
existing policies, specifically the CDEM framework discussed in Section 3 and the Rural 
Adverse Events Policy administered by the Ministry of Primary Industry’s and designed 
to communicate the responsibilities of individuals, local communities and Government in 
the event of any disruption caused to a rural community by climatic or natural disaster. 
 
At the same time as pledging wholehearted support to help Canterbury recover, the 
Government has also shown a very clear awareness of the issue of moral hazard – of 
not giving advantage to people who have not looked after themselves.  Tied with this 
concern is also the issue of setting precedents in terms of community’s expectations of 
the Government in any future disaster.  Also clearly evidenced in action and discussion 
is a reluctance to interfere in free market operations – most notably the rental housing 
and insurance markets.  Key drivers of Government response policies are that 
Government assistance needs to be targeted, capped, timely, temporary and 
proportionate to the magnitude of the effects.  
 
Central government put a range of policies in place to support Canterbury following the 
2010-11 earthquakes, which are discussed below. 
 
4.1. Earthquake Support Subsidy (ESS) 
 
Short term grants were made available to employers to allow them to continue wage 
payments in the immediate six weeks post disaster.  This program, rolled out only 6 days 
after the disaster, allowed employers who intended to recommence operations a grant of up 
to $500 per week per full time employee for up to six weeks or $400 a week for six weeks for 
employees whose employers were un-contactable or who indicated their business was 
closed permanently (Ministry of Social Development, 2011).   The intent of this policy was to 
enable business and employees to assess their situation and ideally prevent a massive 
surge in unemployment benefit applications.    High level discussions ensured that ESS 
support was in addition to any business interruption payments receivable under insurance 
claims.  The program was led by the Ministry of Social Development and implemented via 
existing social welfare payment mechanisms.    Media reports indicate that the ESS was 
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very well received by business with comments that it “saved their business from failure and 
staff from the dole queue” (Steeman, 2011a). 
 
4.2. Tax leniency 
 
Leniency was permitted for businesses who could not access their financial records or for 
whom cash flow was causing a temporary issue.  Information brochures and a specific 
support line complemented an overall flexible approach taken by taxation authorities (Inland 
Revenue, 2011). 
 
4.3. Managing the rebuild 
 
The Government appointed New Zealand’s largest construction firm, Fletchers Construction 
Ltd, to coordinate the rebuild for all residential housing with damage between $10,000 (later 
raised to $15,000) and $100,0004.  The aims of this move were to ensure that “the capital 
available for reconstruction is actually used for that purpose” (Cowan & Simpson, 2011, p. 
9), standards are consistent, and demand pressures are managed so as to moderate 
inflation and ensure equity of access to limited contractors.   The impact on this for the many 
SMEs involved in the construction industries is that they are acting as sub-contractors to 
Fletchers with designated rates of remuneration.   
 
4.4. Recover Canterbury 
 
The public service in Canterbury demonstrated remarkable innovation and adaptability in 
working collaboratively across departments and with the private sector to deliver support to 
Canterbury.     The key collaborative effort focused on businesses was the formation of 
Recover Canterbury.  Recover Canterbury is a collaboration between two existing business 
support agencies – the Canterbury Development Corporation (CDC) which is the economic 
development arm of the Christchurch City Council, and the Canterbury Employers Chamber 
of Commerce (CECC) along with Government agencies involved in business support 
including the Ministries of Economic and Social Development, New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise, the Department of Labour, Inland Revenue and ACC (Recover Canterbury, 
                                                
4 The maximum coverage provided by the state run Earthquake Commission.  Damage above this 
figure is covered by the homeowner’s private insurance policy. 
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2012).    Recover Canterbury is intended to be a temporary operation with current plans to 
cease operation in April 2013 at which time, any further needs for assistance will be provided 
by CECC or CDC.   
 
Recover Canterbury provides a free one stop shop for business to obtain support – removing 
the necessity for business to find the right Government agency for their needs and ensuring 
there is little duplication of efforts by various government agencies.   A similar but smaller 
role is offered to the Kaiapoi and Rangiora boroughs through Enterprise North Canterbury.  . 
Business recovery coordinators work with affected businesses on a case by case basis to 
assess viability and where appropriate make a business case for financial assistance from 
the Canterbury Business Recovery Trust (see 4.5).  Vouchers for coaching and training 
workshops are available through a pre-existing business support scheme run by New 
Zealand Trade and Enterprise and additional co-funding was provided by the MBIE for 
qualifying businesses..  This financial assistance follows similar principles to those outlined 
at the wider government level – targeted, specific outcome orientated projects. Other 
activities carried out by Recover Canterbury include facilitating and assisting in the creation 
of local business associations, facilitating the co-location and coordination of SMEs in the 
arts sector and engaging in an on-going feedback process with business engagement 
groups to ensure that issues faced by Canterbury SMEs are identified and communicated.     
Recover Canterbury works cooperatively with the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery 
Authority (see 4.6) and also reports to the MBIE.  
 
Several participants in this research noted that the existence of a strong Chamber of 
Commerce with high membership levels and respected leadership was a key enabler of the 
response effort particularly in terms of good communication and local participation in 
formulating appropriate responses.   Concern was also expressed that this is not necessarily 
the case in other New Zealand communities. 
 
 
4.5. Canterbury Business Recovery Trust (CBRT) 
 
The Canterbury Business Recovery Trust was created following the February 2011 
earthquake and is administered by Recover Canterbury.  The MBIE provided funding of $2.5 
million and assistance with structure and process, recognizing that many SMEs would simply 
require a small amount of financial assistance provided in an easily accessible and timely 
manner.  Donations to this trust total 5.4 million as of June 2012 (Canterbury Business 
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Recovery Trust Fund, 2012).  Grants have been made for marketing, fit-out costs or other 
activities relating to the specific businesses’ recovery plan. 
 
4.6. Other MBIE initiatives 
 
As well as their involvement in the creation and operation of both Recover Canterbury and 
the CBRT, the MBIE also implemented the following assistance measures: 
  
 Funding was provided to pay Canterbury businesses’ registration costs for Business 
Mentors NZ – a program giving SME owners access to a volunteer mentor to assist 
with a fresh perspective on their business.  
 Funding for psychosocial support programs, recognizing that many SMEs did not 
have access to the employee assistance programs common in many larger 
organisations. 
 Provision of resources and information through the business.govt.nz web portal prior 
to the full operationalization of Recovery Canterbury. 
 
4.7.  Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) 
 
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) was created by an Order in Council 
amending the State Sector Act on the 29th March 2011 (Parliamentary Counsel Office: New 
Zealand Legislation, 2011b).  Legislation granting it, together with the Minister for Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery extensive powers to enable a focused, timely and expedited recovery 
of greater Christchurch was enacted in April 20115 (Parliamentary Counsel Office: New 
Zealand Legislation, 2011a).  The creation of CERA to lead and coordinate recovery efforts 
is seen by some as an appropriate recognition that existing policies and structures were 
insufficient for the scale of the task in Canterbury, but by others as an erosion of local 
involvement and control over the recovery process.  Whatever the concerns around the 
overarching powers granted to CERA, it is also recognized that  the creation of this body to 
guide and coordinate was a key step in facilitating recovery (Taylor, Chang, Elwood, Seville, 
& Brunsdon, 2012). 
 
                                                
5 The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011 which replaced the Canterbury Earthquake 
Response and Recovery Act 2010 which was enacted following the initial less damaging 4 September 
earthquake 
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Economic recovery is one of the key work areas for CERA and efforts include targeted 
initiatives for badly affected sectors such as tourism and education, monitoring of economic 
indicators (Appendix 2) and development of an overall economic strategy (Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority, 2012b).  Whilst it is envisaged that the majority of initiatives 
will be privately funded, Government spending is occurring following the principles of 
targeted intervention outlined at the commencement of this section (Canterbury Earthquake 
Recovery Authority, 2012c). 
 
4.8. Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) 
 
The Christchurch Central Development Unit (CCDU) was created in April 2012 as a new unit 
within CERA.  Its mission was to take the initial visions for the city developed by the City 
Council after extensive community consultation and create, within 100 days, a plan for the 
city rebuild.  The CCDU plan released in July 2012 provided certainty over the location of 
major anchor facilities and the particular precincts within the city ( 
Figure 10).   
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Figure 10 - Central City Plan 
Source: (Christchurch Central Development Unit, 2012) 
 
The plan includes designations of particular areas within the city (the frame) for specific 
uses. This results in a large amount of compulsory land acquisition affecting existing 
businesses who have been able to reopen and operate premises which are now designated 
for other purposes (Christchurch Central Development Unit, 2012).  Reactions to the plan as 
reported by media have generally been very favorable; even from some affected business 
owners who have acknowledged the need for an overriding vision for the city.  However as 
with all aspects of recovery, certain issues remain extremely contentious, particularly in 
relation to the amount of compensation that will be offered to affected owners and concerns 
over a lack of local input. 
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4.9. Open for Business 
 
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the Government’s national economic development 
agency coordinated a communication program and travel grants to get the message out to 
export markets that New Zealand was still open for business.  The speedy and coordinated 
response between Government and business was necessary to counter international 
perceptions of the entire country and every business in the region being badly affected.  
Specific grants have also been made from the Canterbury Business Recovery Trust for 
individual businesses to promote their new locations as well as local council initiatives such 
as the creation of a website, www.findchch.com aimed at enabling people to easily find open 
public facilities, restaurants and shops (Christchurch City Council, 2012). 
 
4.10. Targeted funding for specific projects 
 
Whilst the recovery of Christchurch is expected to be largely funded through insurance and 
private means, funding has been made available for specific projects.  $1.8 million dollars 
has been granted by the Science and Innovation Ministry and New Zealand Trade and 
Enterprise towards the creation of an Information Technology Hub which will provide 
facilities for 17 innovation focused companies affected by the quakes (Wright, 2012).   This 
project is in line with overall Government initiatives to build New Zealand’s knowledge 
economy.  $1 million has been made available by the Ministry of Education to support the 
badly hit education sector with the launch of a Christchurch Educated Initiative which is 
responsible for a number of initiatives designed to attract international students back to 
Christchurch (Mann & Law, 2012). 
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5. SME Responses 
 
“Christchurch businesses are like weeds, they grow out of the cracks of the 
pavement, they are hard to kill, they may be pretty ugly, but gosh they are still there” 
Phil O’Reilly, CEO, BusinessNZ 
 
SMEs in the Canterbury region have faced enormous challenges in remaining both open and 
profitable.  For every SME in the region, there is a story and this paper can touch only briefly 
on some of the key responses.    It was noted in the introduction that SMEs are just one part 
of an interlinked system.  A key factor enabling business resumption for many SMEs was the 
excellent performance of lifelines (critical) infrastructure in Canterbury (Fenwick & Brunsdon, 
2012).   Despite extensive damage, power was restored very quickly due to prior investment 
in seismic strengthening and an extensive mutual aid agreement which saw 700 workers 
from NZ and Australia contributing to swift repairs (Giovinazzi & Wilson, 2012).  Water 
supplies were restored to 2/3rds of the affected area within one week.  Whilst roading and 
wastewater networks were significantly damaged, temporary solutions and detours allowed 
business to function.  Two key gateways for supplies into the region – the airport and port 
both resumed operations quickly, the same day for the airport and within days for the port.  
State Highways out of the region were largely unaffected.  
 
The starting point for many businesses was collaboration, cooperation and innovation.  
Unaffected businesses offered temporary space to clients, customers, bankers and in some 
cases even competitors.  Many businesses, including the Chamber of Commerce set up 
operations in homes and garages.   Businesses who were able to comprehend the scale and 
long term implications of the event gained significant first mover advantages in signing 
leases on available commercial space in less affected suburban areas.  Some existing 
businesses in these suburbs prospered with one suburban mall reporting  a rise in sales of 
25% in the immediate year after the disaster (Steeman, 2012).     The Earthquake Support 
Subsidy discussed in Section 4 allowed many firms the time necessary to absorb their new 
reality and plan for the future.  Examples of innovative activity include one city café owner 
now opening at night as a restaurant after realizing what a shortage of evening dining 
locations there were; the café and nightclub who now share premises with a conversion 
occurring at the end of the day; or the two printing firms that now share their premises and 
printing equipment (Berry, 2012a, 2012b; Carville, 2012).   
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Businesses who did not find suitable premises in the immediate aftermath and those forced 
to relocate a significant time after the disaster face a difficult property market with restrictive 
lease conditions and vastly increased prices6. (Stewart, 2012b).   Small businesses with low 
margins are particularly hard hit by the lack of low quality commercial building stock, much of 
which was severely damaged.   
 
There has been a huge geographic and sectoral shift in the region.   Figure 12 prepared by 
CERA and CDC from a variety of sources, including utility usage data, indicates the new 
economic ‘hotspots’ of the city to the west of the badly damaged central business district. 
 
Figure 11 - Canterbury Heat Map 
Source: (Canterbury Development Corporation, 2012) 
                                                
6 Many businesses have been forced to vacate their premises long after the initial events when 
detailed engineering assessments have revealed significant structural weaknesses 
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Whilst there are not yet clear cut numbers relating to business survival or failure, Household 
Labour Force Surveys give a clear indication of the winners and losers showing a decline in 
employment in retail and the increase in transport and construction in the region. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Canterbury Employment by Industry June 2010 - June 2012 
Source: (Statistics New Zealand, 2012b)  
 
Reports on the current performance of SMEs are mixed.  A  survey in April 2012 which 
included 128 Christchurch SMEs reported revenue at the same level for 23% and declines 
for 37% (MYOB, 2011).  This compares to New Zealand overall7, whereby 31% of 
respondents reported decreased business revenue over the prior year (MYOB, 2011).  
                                                
7 Bi-annual commercial survey of 1000+ businesses with 0-200 employees 
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Information gathered by Recover Canterbury business support coordinators showed 51% of 
their clients reporting reduced revenue and 17% with improved revenues.  It is also 
important to note that all of these figures are for businesses that have continued to trade – 
there is still a great deal of uncertainty with regard to the number of businesses who have 
ceased trading permanently.  Whilst these figures indicate a rather negative outlook, overall 
employment and economic indicators are significantly more positive with Paymark, who 
process 75% of all electronic transactions, reporting spending above the national average for 
August 2012 in Canterbury (Canterbury Business Recovery Trust Fund, 2012).  
Unemployment rates in Canterbury are only 6.5%, compared to the national average of 
6.8%, however there has also been a significant fall in the working age population 
(Canterbury Development Corporation, 2012; Statistics New Zealand, 2012b). Recover 
Canterbury has identified mental strain and stress taking a toll as business owners continue 
to face very challenging trading conditions, additional work and stress dealing with insurance 
and operational challenges as well as managing the impacts on their residential situation.  
The three short case studies below illustrate some of the issues faced by business.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ceased 
 
Shane and Cassandra have 
operated Satchmo restaurant in 
Lyttelton for 10 years. Their rented 
premises were not badly damaged 
by the quake but were rendered 
inaccessible due to collapse risk 
from a neighbouring building.  9 
months later after demolition of the 
neighbouring property, a full 
engineering assessment was 
carried out and a program of repairs 
and strengthening outlined.  
Restaurant owners began 
negotiation with their landlord for a 
repair timetable but 2 months later 
were advised that the rent was to be 
doubled and that they were required 
to take responsibility for future 
damage.  They decided the cost 
was too high and the risks to great 
and Satchmos' business phone was 
disconnected for good in Sept 2012 
(Napier, 2012). 
Surviving 
 
Whare is a family run gift and home wares 
store and was located in the CBD.  Their 
premises have been cordoned since the 
February quake.   They shared temporary 
suburban premises with a snow equipment 
shop for four months in the summer season 
and now operate from their home garage as 
well as on-line.  Turnover is 60% lower than 
pre-quake with trade limited to prior loyal 
customers and a reluctance by many people 
to buy potentially breakable items whilst the 
aftershock sequence continues to produce 
large magnitude shakes.  One family member 
has found other employment on a temporary 
basis to support cash flow.  They have 
considered alternative premises however the 
high rents and restrictive lease conditions are 
not attractive given the uncertainty over trade 
levels (Stewart, 2012a). 
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6. Issues encountered by SMEs 
 
In the initial days and weeks following the February earthquake, one of the key issues for 
businesses was access to their premises to retrieve stock, equipment and records.  The 
Central Business District was closed entirely from 22 February 2011 to 9 March 2011 with a 
gradual reduction of the cordon over time as shown in Figures 13 through 16. 
 
  
Figure 13 - Cordon as at 22 February 2011 Figure 14 - Cordon as at 11 April 2011 
Thriving 
 
Local taxi company Blue Star were located just on the edge of the CBD cordon.  They 
were operational the day after Feb 22 but were then given half an hour to evacuate 
their premises when an inspection the following day found serious damage and 
potential fuel leaks from the service station below.  Whilst technically not able to access 
their old premises, some temporary make-safe work was carried out and they were 
able to retrieve essential equipment and move to an adjacent building owned by them 
and unused.   Their existing IT support person was available and a team of 4-5 worked 
flat out for the next three days to enable resumption of operations.  Whilst the nature of 
their clientele and the trips taken has changed, business is thriving.  Like many 
operating businesses they still face significant disruption in moving from their temporary 
premises to a more permanent home.  They also identify labour as a potential growing 
issue as the well-paid rebuild jobs attract their traditional labour force. 
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Figure 15 - Cordon as at 21 December 2011 Figure 16 - Present Cordon - 15 October 2012 
 
 An access system for businesses to retrieve essential items from the outer areas of the 
cordon was not in place until two weeks after the February earthquake (Steeman, 2011b).  
Businesses in the hardest hit zones in the centre were unable to access their premises for 
months and in some cases not at all.  There was extensive protest from businesses during 
this period with claims of unfairness as access was gained by a selected few individuals 
(Brown, 2011) .  Civil Defence officials have acknowledged that the access process was too 
slow (Heather, 2011).  
 
Moving forward to today, the most prominent current issues reported by business recovery 
coordinators working with Canterbury businesses are: 
 
Cashflow & Finance:    
 Reduced trade due to changed demand and location issues. 
 Increased operating costs, particularly insurance and rent.   
 Time-lags between expenditure and insurance settlement.   
 Inadequate insurance cover. 
 Discounting to attract custom. 
 
Building Relocation Issues: 
 New uncertainty for some businesses in CCDU designated activity zones. 
 Lack of affordable rentals. 
 Ongoing anxiety regarding further aftershocks, detailed building inspections and 
required remediation work.  
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Marketing: 
 Ongoing struggle to both retain old customers in their new locations and to attract 
new trade.   
 
Insurance : 
 Delays in assessment, action and payment 
 
7. Policy Recommendations 
 
As noted in Section 2, New Zealand businesses operate in a free market economy with 
comparatively little Government intervention.  In line with this, there seems to be little 
expectation of additional government assistance in the current Canterbury circumstances.   
Many have acknowledged the provision of ESS and the assistance offered by Recover 
Canterbury as hugely important to them.  The key area where there is a call for Government 
input is in the provision of preparedness resources or business survival guides aimed 
specifically at the SME sector.    
 
The Small Business Advisory Group suggested in their 2012 report that resources should be 
made available through the business.govt.nz website and, as noted in Section 3, this has 
now occurred.  However, some have questioned whether a standalone location would 
enable the information to be more easily found..  There is also the issue of whether the 
government is the best provider of this information or whether dissemination through industry 
or business associations would lead to greater interest.    
 
Wherever the information resides, there is a danger at present of duplication of effort or 
mixed messages as different  groups prepare their own resources, either through a lack of 
awareness of the resources that do exist or dissatisfaction with their content.  Engagement 
of all interested parties - MCDEM, MBIE, Local CDEM staff, resilience experts and business 
organisations in the production/compilation of resources may greatly enhance the visibility of 
resilience if it results in the same message being promoted by multiple sources.  
Engagement in collaborative production would both solve the problems of conflicting 
messages and duplication of effort. Multiple channels of promotion would increase the 
likelihood of organisations finding the information.  Having just endured a significant disaster, 
this effort would also be a practical way to ensure that lessons learned by Canterbury SMEs 
are reflected in resilience advice. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
The Canterbury earthquakes presented the greatest test to date of the overall resilience 
policy of New Zealand.  A review of the pre-existing policy framework and the responses 
required post event illustrate that no policy framework devised in times of calm can deal with 
all of the eventualities faced in a time of crisis.  Building the adaptive capacity that has been 
shown in both the government policy responses and in the actions of Canterbury SMEs 
should be considered a key part to any overall resilience policy.  Any policy aimed at 
improving the resilience of SMEs needs to look outside of the sector and identify the key 
dependencies – most notably the critical infrastructure which was a crucial part of the swift 
resumption of business for many firms in Canterbury.  Policy and responses in Canterbury 
were strongly influenced by the prevailing political ideology.  Notwithstanding this, there are 
valuable lessons to be learned from understanding New Zealand’s recent experiences and 
considering how they may best be applied to differing contexts to improve SME resilience. 
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